service, server : analyse par champ, HTTP, auth locale + OIDC (sur le modèle de Logstream)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015a8P6WMRPeqdpd5VCh6jAy
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claude BotandClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-10-13 16:01:32 +02:00
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package server
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto"
"crypto/ecdsa"
"crypto/elliptic"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/rsa"
"crypto/sha256"
_ "crypto/sha512" // SHA-384/512 for RS384, ES384, RS512…
"crypto/subtle"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"log"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"pve-confsync/internal/store"
)
// Authentication of the web UI, on the model of Logstream (auth.go, auth_local.go):
// local accounts (SQLite, PBKDF2) shown on a login page, and/or an OpenID Connect
// provider (Keycloak, Authentik, Authelia…) with the authorization code flow and
// PKCE. Both can be enabled together: the local accounts stay the way in when the
// provider is down. Sessions are HMAC signed cookies. Only the standard library.
const (
sessionCookie = "confsync_session"
loginCookie = "confsync_login_" // + state: one cookie per OIDC login in progress
loginTTL = 10 * time.Minute
clockSkew = time.Minute
loginPage = "/login.html"
)
var loginFailDelay = time.Second // slows down password guessing
// AuthConfig is read from the environment (see README).
type AuthConfig struct {
Local bool // local accounts (AUTH_LOCAL, default true)
Issuer string
ClientID string
ClientSecret string
RedirectURL string
Scopes string
GroupsClaim string
AdminGroup string // OIDC_ADMIN_GROUP: members are admins
OperatorGroup string // OIDC_OPERATOR_GROUP: members are operators
DefaultRole string // OIDC_DEFAULT_ROLE: everyone else (default viewer)
SessionTTL time.Duration
DataDir string
Demo bool // demo mode: the login page lists the demo accounts
}
// OIDCEnabled tells whether an OpenID Connect provider is configured.
func (c AuthConfig) OIDCEnabled() bool { return c.Issuer != "" }
// Identity is the logged in user.
type Identity struct {
User string `json:"user"`
Role string `json:"role"`
Mode string `json:"mode"` // local or oidc
}
type ctxKey struct{}
// identity returns the user of a request (set by the middleware).
func identity(r *http.Request) Identity {
id, _ := r.Context().Value(ctxKey{}).(Identity)
return id
}
type session struct {
User string `json:"u"`
Role string `json:"r"`
Mode string `json:"m"`
Epoch int64 `json:"p,omitempty"` // local: password epoch, a new password ends the sessions
Exp int64 `json:"e"`
}
// Auth is the middleware protecting the UI and the API.
type Auth struct {
cfg AuthConfig
store *store.Store
key []byte
secure bool // cookies HTTPS only (OIDC_REDIRECT_URL in https)
audit func(r *http.Request, id Identity, action, target string, ok bool, detail string)
next http.Handler
callback string
client *http.Client
mu sync.Mutex
meta *oidcMeta
keys map[string]crypto.PublicKey
keysAt time.Time
}
// NewAuth checks the configuration and loads the session key.
func NewAuth(c AuthConfig, st *store.Store) (*Auth, error) {
if c.SessionTTL <= 0 {
c.SessionTTL = 12 * time.Hour
}
if c.DefaultRole == "" {
c.DefaultRole = store.RoleViewer
}
if !store.ValidRole(c.DefaultRole) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("OIDC_DEFAULT_ROLE=%q: expected admin, operator or viewer", c.DefaultRole)
}
a := &Auth{cfg: c, store: st, key: sessionKey(c.DataDir), client: &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}}
if !c.Local && !c.OIDCEnabled() {
return nil, errors.New("AUTH_LOCAL=false needs an OIDC provider (OIDC_ISSUER)")
}
if c.OIDCEnabled() {
var missing []string
for _, v := range [][2]string{{"OIDC_CLIENT_ID", c.ClientID}, {"OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET", c.ClientSecret}, {"OIDC_REDIRECT_URL", c.RedirectURL}} {
if v[1] == "" {
missing = append(missing, v[0])
}
}
if len(missing) > 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("OIDC: missing %s", strings.Join(missing, ", "))
}
ru, err := url.Parse(c.RedirectURL)
if err != nil || ru.Host == "" || ru.Path == "" || ru.Path == "/" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("OIDC_REDIRECT_URL=%q: expected a full URL such as https://confsync.example.org/auth/callback", c.RedirectURL)
}
a.callback, a.secure = ru.Path, ru.Scheme == "https"
if a.cfg.Scopes == "" {
a.cfg.Scopes = "openid profile email"
}
if !strings.Contains(" "+a.cfg.Scopes+" ", " openid ") {
a.cfg.Scopes = "openid " + a.cfg.Scopes
}
if a.cfg.GroupsClaim == "" {
a.cfg.GroupsClaim = "groups"
}
if c.AdminGroup == "" && c.OperatorGroup == "" {
log.Printf("oidc: no OIDC_ADMIN_GROUP / OIDC_OPERATOR_GROUP, every OIDC user gets the role %s", c.DefaultRole)
}
}
return a, nil
}
// CheckProvider reads the provider configuration at startup so a mistake shows in the logs.
func (a *Auth) CheckProvider() {
if a.cfg.OIDCEnabled() {
if _, err := a.discover(); err != nil {
log.Printf("oidc: %v", err)
} else {
log.Printf("oidc authentication enabled (issuer %s)", a.cfg.Issuer)
}
}
}
// sessionKey is kept in the data directory so sessions survive a restart.
func sessionKey(dir string) []byte {
path := filepath.Join(dir, "session.key")
if k, err := os.ReadFile(path); err == nil && len(k) >= 32 {
return k
}
k := make([]byte, 32)
if _, err := rand.Read(k); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("session key: %v", err)
}
if err := os.WriteFile(path, k, 0o600); err != nil {
log.Printf("auth: cannot save %s (%v): sessions end when the server restarts", path, err)
}
return k
}
// public paths: reachable without a session.
func public(p string) bool {
switch p {
case "/healthz", loginPage, "/style.css", "/boot.js", "/login.js", "/favicon.svg", "/auth/config", "/auth/login", "/auth/logout", "/auth/oidc":
return true
}
return false
}
func (a *Auth) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch {
case r.URL.Path == "/auth/login":
a.handleLogin(w, r)
return
case r.URL.Path == "/auth/logout":
a.handleLogout(w, r)
return
case r.URL.Path == "/auth/oidc" && a.cfg.OIDCEnabled():
a.startLogin(w, r)
return
case a.callback != "" && r.URL.Path == a.callback:
a.handleCallback(w, r)
return
case r.URL.Path == "/auth/config":
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"local": a.cfg.Local, "oidc": a.cfg.OIDCEnabled(), "demo": a.cfg.Demo})
return
}
id, ok := a.sessionIdentity(r)
if ok {
if r.URL.Path == loginPage {
http.Redirect(w, r, safeReturn(r.URL.Query().Get("r")), http.StatusFound)
return
}
a.next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxKey{}, id)))
return
}
switch {
case public(r.URL.Path):
if r.URL.Path == loginPage {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
}
a.next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
case r.Method == http.MethodGet && !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api/") && r.URL.Path != "/auth/me":
target := loginPage
if ret := r.URL.RequestURI(); ret != "/" {
target += "?" + url.Values{"r": {ret}}.Encode()
}
http.Redirect(w, r, target, http.StatusFound)
default:
writeJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, map[string]string{"error": "authentication required", "code": "auth"})
}
}
// sessionIdentity checks the session cookie. Local accounts are read again from
// the database: a deleted user, a new role or a new password apply at once.
func (a *Auth) sessionIdentity(r *http.Request) (Identity, bool) {
var s session
c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie)
if err != nil || !verifyCookie(a.key, c.Value, &s) || time.Now().Unix() >= s.Exp {
return Identity{}, false
}
switch s.Mode {
case "local":
if !a.cfg.Local {
return Identity{}, false
}
u, err := a.store.User(r.Context(), s.User)
if err != nil || u.Epoch != s.Epoch {
return Identity{}, false
}
return Identity{User: u.Name, Role: u.Role, Mode: "local"}, true
case "oidc":
if !a.cfg.OIDCEnabled() || !store.ValidRole(s.Role) {
return Identity{}, false
}
return Identity{User: s.User, Role: s.Role, Mode: "oidc"}, true
}
return Identity{}, false
}
func (a *Auth) setSession(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, s session) {
s.Exp = time.Now().Add(a.cfg.SessionTTL).Unix()
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: sessionCookie,
Value: signCookie(a.key, s),
Path: "/",
MaxAge: int(a.cfg.SessionTTL.Seconds()),
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: a.secure || isHTTPS(r),
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode,
})
}
func (a *Auth) handleLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost || !a.cfg.Local {
http.Redirect(w, r, loginPage, http.StatusFound)
return
}
user, pass := strings.TrimSpace(r.PostFormValue("user")), r.PostFormValue("pass")
ret := safeReturn(r.PostFormValue("r"))
u, ok := a.store.Authenticate(r.Context(), user, pass)
if !ok {
log.Printf("auth: failed login for %q from %s", user, clientIP(r))
a.audit(r, Identity{User: user, Mode: "local"}, "login", "", false, "mot de passe ou utilisateur incorrect")
time.Sleep(loginFailDelay)
q := url.Values{"e": {"1"}}
if ret != "/" {
q.Set("r", ret)
}
http.Redirect(w, r, loginPage+"?"+q.Encode(), http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
id := Identity{User: u.Name, Role: u.Role, Mode: "local"}
log.Printf("auth: %s logged in from %s (%s)", u.Name, clientIP(r), u.Role)
a.audit(r, id, "login", "", true, "")
a.setSession(w, r, session{User: u.Name, Role: u.Role, Mode: "local", Epoch: u.Epoch})
http.Redirect(w, r, ret, http.StatusSeeOther)
}
// handleLogout ends the session; with OIDC the provider's session ends on its logout page if it has one.
func (a *Auth) handleLogout(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id, ok := a.sessionIdentity(r)
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: sessionCookie, Path: "/", MaxAge: -1, HttpOnly: true, Secure: a.secure || isHTTPS(r)})
if ok {
a.audit(r, id, "logout", "", true, "")
}
if ok && id.Mode == "oidc" {
if meta, err := a.discover(); err == nil && meta.EndSession != "" {
http.Redirect(w, r, addQuery(meta.EndSession, url.Values{"client_id": {a.cfg.ClientID}}), http.StatusFound)
return
}
}
http.Redirect(w, r, loginPage, http.StatusFound)
}
// safeReturn keeps the page to open after login inside the application.
func safeReturn(ret string) string {
if !strings.HasPrefix(ret, "/") || strings.HasPrefix(ret, "//") || strings.HasPrefix(ret, "/\\") || ret == loginPage {
return "/"
}
return ret
}
// isHTTPS is true when the browser talks HTTPS, directly or through a reverse proxy.
func isHTTPS(r *http.Request) bool {
return r.TLS != nil || strings.EqualFold(r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Proto"), "https")
}
func clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
if f := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); f != "" {
return strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(f, ",")[0])
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return host
}
// ---- OpenID Connect ----
type oidcMeta struct {
Issuer string `json:"issuer"`
AuthEndpoint string `json:"authorization_endpoint"`
TokenEndpoint string `json:"token_endpoint"`
JWKSURI string `json:"jwks_uri"`
EndSession string `json:"end_session_endpoint"`
TokenAuthMethods []string `json:"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"`
}
type loginState struct {
Nonce string `json:"n"`
Verifier string `json:"v"`
Return string `json:"r"`
Exp int64 `json:"e"`
}
func (a *Auth) startLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
meta, err := a.discover()
if err != nil {
log.Printf("oidc: %v", err)
http.Error(w, "identity provider unreachable, try again later", http.StatusBadGateway)
return
}
state, nonce, verifier := randomString(), randomString(), randomString()+randomString()
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{
Name: loginCookie + state,
Value: signCookie(a.key, loginState{Nonce: nonce, Verifier: verifier, Return: safeReturn(r.URL.Query().Get("r")), Exp: time.Now().Add(loginTTL).Unix()}),
Path: "/",
MaxAge: int(loginTTL.Seconds()),
HttpOnly: true,
Secure: a.secure,
SameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, // sent back on the redirect from the provider
})
challenge := sha256.Sum256([]byte(verifier))
q := url.Values{
"response_type": {"code"},
"client_id": {a.cfg.ClientID},
"redirect_uri": {a.cfg.RedirectURL},
"scope": {a.cfg.Scopes},
"state": {state},
"nonce": {nonce},
"code_challenge": {base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(challenge[:])},
"code_challenge_method": {"S256"},
}
http.Redirect(w, r, addQuery(meta.AuthEndpoint, q), http.StatusFound)
}
func (a *Auth) handleCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
q := r.URL.Query()
if e := q.Get("error"); e != "" {
log.Printf("oidc: login refused by the provider: %s %s", e, q.Get("error_description"))
http.Error(w, "login refused by the identity provider: "+e, http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
state := q.Get("state")
var ls loginState
c, err := r.Cookie(loginCookie + state)
if state == "" || err != nil || !verifyCookie(a.key, c.Value, &ls) || time.Now().Unix() > ls.Exp {
http.Error(w, "login expired or started in another browser: open pve-confsync again", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
http.SetCookie(w, &http.Cookie{Name: loginCookie + state, Path: "/", MaxAge: -1, HttpOnly: true, Secure: a.secure})
user, role, err := a.exchange(r, q.Get("code"), ls)
if err != nil {
log.Printf("oidc: login failed: %v", err)
a.audit(r, Identity{Mode: "oidc"}, "login", "", false, err.Error())
http.Error(w, "login failed, see the pve-confsync logs", http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
id := Identity{User: user, Role: role, Mode: "oidc"}
log.Printf("oidc: %s logged in (%s)", user, role)
a.audit(r, id, "login", "", true, "")
a.setSession(w, r, session{User: user, Role: role, Mode: "oidc"})
http.Redirect(w, r, ls.Return, http.StatusFound)
}
// exchange trades the code for tokens and returns the user name from the verified
// ID token and the role given by its groups.
func (a *Auth) exchange(r *http.Request, code string, ls loginState) (string, string, error) {
if code == "" {
return "", "", errors.New("no code in the callback")
}
meta, err := a.discover()
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
form := url.Values{
"grant_type": {"authorization_code"},
"code": {code},
"redirect_uri": {a.cfg.RedirectURL},
"code_verifier": {ls.Verifier},
}
// client_secret_basic is the default; some providers only accept client_secret_post.
post := len(meta.TokenAuthMethods) > 0 && !contains(meta.TokenAuthMethods, "client_secret_basic") && contains(meta.TokenAuthMethods, "client_secret_post")
if post {
form.Set("client_id", a.cfg.ClientID)
form.Set("client_secret", a.cfg.ClientSecret)
}
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(r.Context(), http.MethodPost, meta.TokenEndpoint, strings.NewReader(form.Encode()))
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
if !post {
req.SetBasicAuth(url.QueryEscape(a.cfg.ClientID), url.QueryEscape(a.cfg.ClientSecret))
}
res, err := a.client.Do(req)
if err != nil {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("token endpoint: %w", err)
}
defer res.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(res.Body, 1<<20))
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("token endpoint: %s: %s", res.Status, bytes.TrimSpace(body))
}
var tok struct {
IDToken string `json:"id_token"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &tok); err != nil || tok.IDToken == "" {
return "", "", errors.New("token endpoint: no id_token in the response")
}
claims, err := a.verifyIDToken(tok.IDToken, ls.Nonce)
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
role := a.cfg.DefaultRole
switch {
case a.cfg.AdminGroup != "" && hasGroup(claims[a.cfg.GroupsClaim], a.cfg.AdminGroup):
role = store.RoleAdmin
case a.cfg.OperatorGroup != "" && hasGroup(claims[a.cfg.GroupsClaim], a.cfg.OperatorGroup):
role = store.RoleOperator
}
for _, k := range []string{"preferred_username", "email", "name", "sub"} {
if v, _ := claims[k].(string); v != "" {
return v, role, nil
}
}
return "", "", errors.New("id_token: no sub")
}
// hasGroup tells whether the groups claim (a list, or a single string) holds
// group; a leading "/" (Keycloak group paths) is ignored.
func hasGroup(claim any, group string) bool {
group = strings.TrimPrefix(group, "/")
var groups []string
switch v := claim.(type) {
case string:
groups = strings.Fields(strings.ReplaceAll(v, ",", " "))
case []any:
for _, g := range v {
if s, ok := g.(string); ok {
groups = append(groups, s)
}
}
}
for _, g := range groups {
if strings.TrimPrefix(g, "/") == group {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// verifyIDToken checks the signature (keys from jwks_uri) and the claims of an ID token.
func (a *Auth) verifyIDToken(raw, nonce string) (map[string]any, error) {
parts := strings.Split(raw, ".")
if len(parts) != 3 {
return nil, errors.New("id_token: not a JWT")
}
var hdr struct {
Alg string `json:"alg"`
Kid string `json:"kid"`
}
if err := decodeSegment(parts[0], &hdr); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token header: %w", err)
}
sig, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(parts[2])
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.New("id_token: bad signature encoding")
}
key, err := a.keyFor(hdr.Kid)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := verifySignature(hdr.Alg, key, []byte(parts[0]+"."+parts[1]), sig); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token: %w", err)
}
var claims map[string]any
if err := decodeSegment(parts[1], &claims); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token claims: %w", err)
}
if iss, _ := claims["iss"].(string); iss != a.cfg.Issuer {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token: issuer %q, expected %q", iss, a.cfg.Issuer)
}
var aud []string
switch v := claims["aud"].(type) {
case string:
aud = []string{v}
case []any:
for _, x := range v {
if s, ok := x.(string); ok {
aud = append(aud, s)
}
}
}
if !contains(aud, a.cfg.ClientID) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token: audience %v does not include %q", aud, a.cfg.ClientID)
}
if azp, ok := claims["azp"].(string); ok && len(aud) > 1 && azp != a.cfg.ClientID {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token: azp %q", azp)
}
now := time.Now()
exp, _ := claims["exp"].(float64)
if exp == 0 || now.After(time.Unix(int64(exp), 0).Add(clockSkew)) {
return nil, errors.New("id_token: expired (check the clocks)")
}
if iat, ok := claims["iat"].(float64); ok && time.Unix(int64(iat), 0).After(now.Add(clockSkew)) {
return nil, errors.New("id_token: issued in the future (check the clocks)")
}
if n, _ := claims["nonce"].(string); subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(n), []byte(nonce)) != 1 {
return nil, errors.New("id_token: wrong nonce")
}
return claims, nil
}
func verifySignature(alg string, key crypto.PublicKey, signed, sig []byte) error {
if len(alg) != 5 {
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported algorithm %q", alg)
}
var h crypto.Hash
switch alg[2:] {
case "256":
h = crypto.SHA256
case "384":
h = crypto.SHA384
case "512":
h = crypto.SHA512
}
if h == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("unsupported algorithm %q", alg)
}
hh := h.New()
hh.Write(signed)
digest := hh.Sum(nil)
switch k := key.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
switch alg[:2] {
case "RS":
return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(k, h, digest, sig)
case "PS":
return rsa.VerifyPSS(k, h, digest, sig, &rsa.PSSOptions{SaltLength: rsa.PSSSaltLengthEqualsHash})
}
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
size := (k.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) / 8
if alg[:2] != "ES" || len(sig) != 2*size {
break
}
r, s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:size]), new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[size:])
if ecdsa.Verify(k, digest, r, s) {
return nil
}
return errors.New("bad signature")
}
return fmt.Errorf("algorithm %q does not match the key", alg)
}
// discover reads the provider configuration once (and again after a failure).
func (a *Auth) discover() (*oidcMeta, error) {
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
if a.meta != nil {
return a.meta, nil
}
u := strings.TrimSuffix(a.cfg.Issuer, "/") + "/.well-known/openid-configuration"
var m oidcMeta
if err := a.getJSON(u, &m); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery: %w", err)
}
if m.Issuer != a.cfg.Issuer {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("discovery: the provider says its issuer is %q, set OIDC_ISSUER to that exact value", m.Issuer)
}
if m.AuthEndpoint == "" || m.TokenEndpoint == "" || m.JWKSURI == "" {
return nil, errors.New("discovery: incomplete provider configuration")
}
a.meta = &m
return a.meta, nil
}
// keyFor returns the signing key kid; the key set is reloaded when the provider rotates its keys.
func (a *Auth) keyFor(kid string) (crypto.PublicKey, error) {
meta, err := a.discover()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
a.mu.Lock()
defer a.mu.Unlock()
pick := func() crypto.PublicKey {
if k, ok := a.keys[kid]; ok {
return k
}
if kid == "" && len(a.keys) == 1 {
for _, k := range a.keys {
return k
}
}
return nil
}
if k := pick(); k != nil {
return k, nil
}
if time.Since(a.keysAt) < 10*time.Second {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token: unknown key %q", kid)
}
var set struct {
Keys []struct {
Kty string `json:"kty"`
Kid string `json:"kid"`
Use string `json:"use"`
N string `json:"n"`
E string `json:"e"`
Crv string `json:"crv"`
X string `json:"x"`
Y string `json:"y"`
} `json:"keys"`
}
if err := a.getJSON(meta.JWKSURI, &set); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("jwks: %w", err)
}
keys := map[string]crypto.PublicKey{}
for _, k := range set.Keys {
if k.Use != "" && k.Use != "sig" {
continue
}
switch k.Kty {
case "RSA":
n, e := decodeBig(k.N), decodeBig(k.E)
if n != nil && e != nil && e.IsInt64() {
keys[k.Kid] = &rsa.PublicKey{N: n, E: int(e.Int64())}
}
case "EC":
var c elliptic.Curve
switch k.Crv {
case "P-256":
c = elliptic.P256()
case "P-384":
c = elliptic.P384()
case "P-521":
c = elliptic.P521()
}
x, y := decodeBig(k.X), decodeBig(k.Y)
if c != nil && x != nil && y != nil && c.IsOnCurve(x, y) {
keys[k.Kid] = &ecdsa.PublicKey{Curve: c, X: x, Y: y}
}
}
}
a.keys, a.keysAt = keys, time.Now()
if k := pick(); k != nil {
return k, nil
}
return nil, fmt.Errorf("id_token: unknown key %q", kid)
}
func (a *Auth) getJSON(u string, v any) error {
res, err := a.client.Get(u)
if err != nil {
return err
}
defer res.Body.Close()
if res.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
return fmt.Errorf("%s: %s", u, res.Status)
}
return json.NewDecoder(io.LimitReader(res.Body, 1<<20)).Decode(v)
}
// Cookies are base64url(JSON) + "." + base64url(HMAC-SHA256).
func signCookie(key []byte, v any) string {
b, _ := json.Marshal(v)
p := base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
m := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
m.Write([]byte(p))
return p + "." + base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(m.Sum(nil))
}
func verifyCookie(key []byte, s string, v any) bool {
p, sig, ok := strings.Cut(s, ".")
if !ok {
return false
}
got, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(sig)
if err != nil {
return false
}
m := hmac.New(sha256.New, key)
m.Write([]byte(p))
if !hmac.Equal(got, m.Sum(nil)) {
return false
}
return decodeSegment(p, v) == nil
}
func decodeSegment(s string, v any) error {
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(s)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return json.Unmarshal(b, v)
}
func decodeBig(s string) *big.Int {
b, err := base64.RawURLEncoding.DecodeString(s)
if err != nil || len(b) == 0 {
return nil
}
return new(big.Int).SetBytes(b)
}
func randomString() string {
b := make([]byte, 16)
if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
panic(err)
}
return base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
}
func addQuery(endpoint string, q url.Values) string {
sep := "?"
if strings.Contains(endpoint, "?") {
sep = "&"
}
return endpoint + sep + q.Encode()
}
func contains(list []string, s string) bool {
for _, v := range list {
if v == s {
return true
}
}
return false
}
+178
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
// Package server is the web UI of pve-confsync (phases 1 and 2): cluster list,
// visual diff per client, dry-run and synchronization per object, per client or
// global, execution journal and audit trail. The pages (web/) are embedded in
// the binary; the API is JSON under /api/.
package server
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"io/fs"
"log"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"pve-confsync/internal/service"
"pve-confsync/internal/store"
)
// Options of the server.
type Options struct {
Store *store.Store
Auth AuthConfig
Static fs.FS // web/ (index.html, login.html, style.css, app.js…)
Version string // shown in the UI
Demo bool // demo mode: fake PVE clusters, shown in the UI
}
// Server holds the state shared by the handlers.
type Server struct {
opts Options
store *store.Store
auth *Auth
// last comparison, shown until the next refresh (reading N clusters takes time)
stateMu sync.Mutex
state *service.State
stateAt time.Time
applyMu sync.Mutex // one synchronization at a time
jobs sync.WaitGroup
}
// New builds the server.
func New(o Options) (*Server, error) {
a, err := NewAuth(o.Auth, o.Store)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s := &Server{opts: o, store: o.Store, auth: a}
a.audit = s.audit
if err := o.Store.FailRunning(context.Background()); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return s, nil
}
// Wait waits for the synchronizations in progress (graceful stop).
func (s *Server) Wait() { s.jobs.Wait() }
// Handler returns the HTTP handler: authentication, then API and static files.
func (s *Server) Handler() http.Handler {
mux := http.NewServeMux()
mux.HandleFunc("GET /healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { _, _ = w.Write([]byte("ok\n")) })
mux.HandleFunc("GET /auth/me", s.handleMe)
viewer, operator, admin := store.RoleViewer, store.RoleOperator, store.RoleAdmin
mux.Handle("GET /api/state", s.role(viewer, s.handleState))
mux.Handle("POST /api/dryrun", s.role(operator, s.handleDryRun))
mux.Handle("POST /api/apply", s.role(operator, s.handleApply))
mux.Handle("GET /api/runs", s.role(viewer, s.handleRuns))
mux.Handle("GET /api/runs/{id}", s.role(viewer, s.handleRun))
mux.Handle("GET /api/clusters", s.role(viewer, s.handleClusters))
mux.Handle("PUT /api/clusters/{name}", s.role(admin, s.handleSaveCluster))
mux.Handle("DELETE /api/clusters/{name}", s.role(admin, s.handleDeleteCluster))
mux.Handle("POST /api/clusters/{name}/check", s.role(admin, s.handleCheckCluster))
mux.Handle("GET /api/settings", s.role(viewer, s.handleSettings))
mux.Handle("PUT /api/settings", s.role(admin, s.handleSaveSettings))
mux.Handle("GET /api/config/export", s.role(admin, s.handleExport))
mux.Handle("POST /api/config/import", s.role(admin, s.handleImport))
mux.Handle("GET /api/users", s.role(admin, s.handleUsers))
mux.Handle("PUT /api/users/{name}", s.role(admin, s.handleSaveUser))
mux.Handle("DELETE /api/users/{name}", s.role(admin, s.handleDeleteUser))
mux.Handle("POST /api/account/password", s.role(viewer, s.handlePassword))
mux.Handle("GET /api/audit", s.role(admin, s.handleAudit))
static := http.FileServerFS(s.opts.Static)
mux.Handle("GET /", http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, ".html") || r.URL.Path == "/" {
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-cache")
}
static.ServeHTTP(w, r)
}))
s.auth.next = mux
return securityHeaders(s.auth)
}
// securityHeaders: no inline script, no framing, no MIME sniffing.
func securityHeaders(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
h := w.Header()
h.Set("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; style-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'")
h.Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
h.Set("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin")
h.Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
})
}
// role restricts a handler to a minimum role. Writes must carry the header
// X-Confsync (set by app.js): a page of another site cannot add it to a
// cross-site request without a CORS preflight, which is never granted (CSRF).
func (s *Server) role(min string, h http.HandlerFunc) http.Handler {
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id := identity(r)
if r.Method != http.MethodGet && r.Header.Get("X-Confsync") != "1" {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "missing X-Confsync header", "csrf")
return
}
if store.RoleRank(id.Role) < store.RoleRank(min) {
writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "role "+min+" required", "forbidden")
return
}
h(w, r)
})
}
func (s *Server) handleMe(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
id := identity(r)
if id.User == "" {
writeError(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, "authentication required", "auth")
return
}
writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
"user": id.User, "role": id.Role, "mode": id.Mode,
"version": s.opts.Version, "demo": s.opts.Demo,
"local": s.opts.Auth.Local, "oidc": s.opts.Auth.OIDCEnabled(),
})
}
// audit records an event of the audit trail (never a secret in detail).
func (s *Server) audit(r *http.Request, id Identity, action, target string, ok bool, detail string) {
if id.User == "" {
id = identity(r)
}
e := store.Event{User: id.User, Role: id.Role, IP: clientIP(r), Action: action, Target: target, OK: ok, Detail: detail}
if err := s.store.Audit(context.WithoutCancel(r.Context()), e); err != nil {
log.Printf("audit: %v", err)
}
}
// ---- JSON helpers ----
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, v any) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
w.WriteHeader(code)
enc := json.NewEncoder(w)
enc.SetEscapeHTML(false)
_ = enc.Encode(v)
}
func writeError(w http.ResponseWriter, code int, msg, kind string) {
writeJSON(w, code, map[string]string{"error": msg, "code": kind})
}
func readJSON(r *http.Request, v any) error {
dec := json.NewDecoder(http.MaxBytesReader(nil, r.Body, 4<<20))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
if err := dec.Decode(v); err != nil {
return errors.New("invalid request: " + err.Error())
}
return nil
}
+428
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
// Package service puts the engine together for the web UI: it reads the
// reference and the clients, computes the plans and describes every object
// field by field (reference, client mapping, current value, target value).
package service
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"sort"
"sync"
"time"
"pve-confsync/internal/adapter"
"pve-confsync/internal/config"
"pve-confsync/internal/engine"
"pve-confsync/internal/model"
"pve-confsync/internal/pve"
)
// Node is the PVE version of one node.
type Node struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Version string `json:"version"`
}
// ClusterInfo is what was read from one cluster.
type ClusterInfo struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
URL string `json:"url"`
Version string `json:"version,omitempty"`
Nodes []Node `json:"nodes,omitempty"`
Objects int `json:"objects"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
ReadAt time.Time `json:"readAt"`
Millis int64 `json:"ms"`
}
// Field compares one field of an object.
type Field struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Policy adapter.Policy `json:"policy"`
Ref any `json:"ref,omitempty"` // value on the reference
Mapping any `json:"mapping,omitempty"` // value of the client mapping
Current any `json:"current,omitempty"` // value on the client
Target any `json:"target,omitempty"` // value after a synchronization
Change string `json:"change,omitempty"` // add, set, unset or empty
}
// Row statuses.
const (
StatusSame = "same" // in line with the reference
StatusCreate = "create" // missing on the client
StatusUpdate = "update" // different
StatusDelete = "delete" // absent from the reference, deleted (prune)
StatusExtra = "extra" // absent from the reference, kept (no prune)
StatusError = "error" // blocking error (missing mapping, immutable field)
)
// Row is one object of a client.
type Row struct {
Kind model.Kind `json:"kind"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Key string `json:"key"`
Status string `json:"status"`
SDN bool `json:"sdn"`
Fields []Field `json:"fields"`
Errors []string `json:"errors,omitempty"`
}
// Client is the state of one client: what it has, its plan and its rows.
type Client struct {
ClusterInfo
Plan engine.Plan `json:"plan"`
Digest string `json:"digest"`
Rows []Row `json:"rows"`
Counts map[string]int `json:"counts"`
}
// State is a full comparison of the reference with its clients.
type State struct {
At time.Time `json:"at"`
Reference ClusterInfo `json:"reference"`
Clients []Client `json:"clients"`
Kinds []model.Kind `json:"kinds"`
Prune bool `json:"prune"`
ref []model.Object
actuals map[string][]model.Object
cfg *config.Config
}
// Analyze reads the reference (applied SDN configuration) and the clients
// (current configuration, in parallel), and compares them. only limits the
// clients (empty: all). A cluster that cannot be read is reported in its
// Error field, it does not stop the others.
func Analyze(ctx context.Context, cfg *config.Config, only []string) *State {
st := &State{At: time.Now().UTC(), Kinds: cfg.Kinds, Prune: cfg.Prune, cfg: cfg, actuals: map[string][]model.Object{}}
var refSnap model.Snapshot
st.Reference, refSnap = read(ctx, cfg.Reference, cfg.Kinds, adapter.ReadRunning)
st.ref = refSnap.Objects
want := map[string]bool{}
for _, n := range only {
want[n] = true
}
var wg sync.WaitGroup
var mu sync.Mutex
for i := range cfg.Clients {
cl := &cfg.Clients[i]
if len(only) > 0 && !want[cl.Name] {
continue
}
st.Clients = append(st.Clients, Client{ClusterInfo: ClusterInfo{Name: cl.Name, URL: cl.URL}})
idx := len(st.Clients) - 1
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
info, snap := read(ctx, cl.Cluster, cfg.Kinds, adapter.ReadCurrent)
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
st.Clients[idx].ClusterInfo = info
if info.Error == "" {
st.actuals[cl.Name] = snap.Objects
}
}()
}
wg.Wait()
for i := range st.Clients {
c := &st.Clients[i]
c.Counts = map[string]int{}
if c.Error != "" || st.Reference.Error != "" {
continue
}
cl, _ := cfg.Client(c.Name)
c.Plan = engine.MakePlan(cfg, cl, st.ref, st.actuals[c.Name])
c.Plan.Warnings = append(c.Plan.Warnings, c.Warnings...)
c.Digest = c.Plan.Digest()
c.Rows = rows(cfg, cl, st.ref, st.actuals[c.Name], c.Plan)
for _, r := range c.Rows {
c.Counts[r.Status]++
}
}
return st
}
func read(ctx context.Context, cl config.Cluster, kinds []model.Kind, mode adapter.ReadMode) (ClusterInfo, model.Snapshot) {
info := ClusterInfo{Name: cl.Name, URL: cl.URL, ReadAt: time.Now().UTC()}
start := time.Now()
defer func() { info.Millis = time.Since(start).Milliseconds() }()
c, err := cl.PVE()
if err != nil {
info.Error = err.Error()
return info, model.Snapshot{}
}
snap, err := engine.Read(ctx, c, kinds, mode)
if err != nil {
info.Error = err.Error()
}
info.Version = snap.PVEVersion
if vs, verr := c.Versions(ctx); verr == nil {
info.Nodes = nodes(vs)
}
info.Objects = len(snap.Objects)
info.Warnings = snap.Warnings
info.Millis = time.Since(start).Milliseconds()
return info, snap
}
// rows describes every object of the reference and of the client, field by field.
func rows(cfg *config.Config, cl *config.Client, ref, actual []model.Object, plan engine.Plan) []Row {
changes := map[string]engine.Change{}
for _, c := range plan.Changes {
changes[c.Key()] = c
}
errs := map[string][]string{}
for _, e := range plan.Errors {
if k, ok := engine.ErrorKey(e); ok {
errs[k] = append(errs[k], e)
}
}
cur := map[string]model.Object{}
for _, o := range actual {
cur[o.Key()] = o
}
var out []Row
seen := map[string]bool{}
add := func(k model.Kind, id string, r *model.Object, c *model.Object) {
a, err := adapter.ByKind(k)
if err != nil {
return
}
key := string(k) + "/" + id
seen[key] = true
row := Row{Kind: k, ID: id, Key: key, SDN: a.SDN(), Errors: errs[key]}
ch, hasChange := changes[key]
switch {
case len(row.Errors) > 0:
row.Status = StatusError
case hasChange:
row.Status = string(ch.Op)
case r == nil:
row.Status = StatusExtra
default:
row.Status = StatusSame
}
var mapping map[string]any
if cl != nil {
mapping = model.Normalize(cl.Mapping[k][id])
a.Canonicalize(mapping)
}
names := map[string]bool{}
for _, o := range []*model.Object{r, c} {
if o != nil {
for f := range o.Fields {
names[f] = true
}
}
}
for f := range mapping {
names[f] = true
}
for f := range ch.Set {
names[f] = true
}
list := make([]string, 0, len(names))
for f := range names {
list = append(list, f)
}
sort.Strings(list)
unset := map[string]bool{}
for _, f := range ch.Unset {
unset[f] = true
}
for _, f := range list {
fd := Field{Name: f, Policy: cfg.Policy(cl, a, f), Mapping: mapping[f]}
if r != nil {
fd.Ref = r.Fields[f]
}
if c != nil {
fd.Current = c.Fields[f]
}
switch {
case ch.Op == OpDelete:
fd.Change = "unset"
case unset[f]:
fd.Change = "unset"
case ch.Set[f] != nil:
fd.Target = ch.Set[f]
if fd.Current != nil {
fd.Change = "set"
} else {
fd.Change = "add"
}
case fd.Policy != adapter.Ignore && fd.Current != nil:
fd.Target = fd.Current
}
row.Fields = append(row.Fields, fd)
}
out = append(out, row)
}
for i := range ref {
r := &ref[i]
if !cfg.Selected(r.Kind, r.ID) {
continue
}
var c *model.Object
if o, ok := cur[r.Key()]; ok {
c = &o
}
add(r.Kind, r.ID, r, c)
}
for i := range actual {
o := &actual[i]
if seen[o.Key()] || !cfg.Selected(o.Kind, o.ID) {
continue
}
add(o.Kind, o.ID, nil, o)
}
sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
if out[i].Kind != out[j].Kind {
return kindRank(out[i].Kind) < kindRank(out[j].Kind)
}
return out[i].ID < out[j].ID
})
return out
}
// OpDelete is re-exported for the switch above (engine.Op is a string type).
const OpDelete = engine.OpDelete
func kindRank(k model.Kind) int {
for i, x := range model.Kinds {
if x == k {
return i
}
}
return len(model.Kinds)
}
// ClientPlan is the plan of one client restricted to a selection of objects.
type ClientPlan struct {
Client string `json:"client"`
Plan engine.Plan `json:"plan"`
Digest string `json:"digest"`
SDN bool `json:"sdn"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` // client or reference unreadable
}
// Plans returns the plans of the given clients restricted to the given objects
// (empty: everything), as a dry-run shows them and an apply checks them.
func (st *State) Plans(keys []string) []ClientPlan {
var out []ClientPlan
for _, c := range st.Clients {
cp := ClientPlan{Client: c.Name}
switch {
case st.Reference.Error != "":
cp.Error = "reference: " + st.Reference.Error
case c.Error != "":
cp.Error = c.Error
default:
cp.Plan = engine.Filter(c.Plan, keys)
cp.Digest = cp.Plan.Digest()
cp.SDN = cp.Plan.HasSDN()
}
out = append(out, cp)
}
return out
}
// Apply writes one plan on a client, then checks that the selected objects are
// in line with the reference (same reference objects as the plan).
func (st *State) Apply(ctx context.Context, cp ClientPlan, keys []string, log func(engine.Step)) error {
cl, ok := st.cfg.Client(cp.Client)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("unknown client %q", cp.Client)
}
c, err := cl.PVE()
if err != nil {
return err
}
res := engine.ApplyWithLog(ctx, c, cp.Plan, log)
if res.Err != nil {
return res.Err
}
start := time.Now()
err = engine.Verify(ctx, c, func(actual []model.Object) engine.Plan {
return engine.Filter(engine.MakePlan(st.cfg, cl, st.ref, actual), keys)
}, st.cfg.Kinds)
s := engine.Step{At: start.UTC(), Action: "verify"}
if err != nil {
s.Error = err.Error()
}
log(s)
return err
}
// Check tests the access to a cluster: versions (9.x only) and token privileges.
type Check struct {
Nodes []Node `json:"nodes,omitempty"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
Warnings []string `json:"warnings,omitempty"`
}
// CheckCluster runs the same checks as the "check" command.
func CheckCluster(ctx context.Context, cl config.Cluster, write, dcOptions bool) Check {
var res Check
c, err := cl.PVE()
if err != nil {
res.Error = err.Error()
return res
}
vs, err := c.CheckVersion(ctx)
res.Nodes = nodes(vs)
if err != nil {
res.Error = err.Error()
return res
}
perms, err := c.Permissions(ctx)
if err != nil {
res.Warnings = append(res.Warnings, fmt.Sprintf("token privileges unreadable (%v)", err))
return res
}
res.Warnings = PrivilegeWarnings(perms, write, dcOptions)
return res
}
// PrivilegeWarnings flags a reference token able to write, and a client token
// missing the privileges needed by the synchronized kinds.
func PrivilegeWarnings(perms map[string]map[string]any, write, dcOptions bool) []string {
has := func(path, priv string) bool { _, ok := perms[path][priv]; return ok }
anyPath := func(priv string) bool {
for p := range perms {
if has(p, priv) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
var w []string
if !write {
for _, p := range []string{"Sys.Modify", "SDN.Allocate", "Permissions.Modify"} {
if anyPath(p) {
w = append(w, "le token de référence possède "+p+" : un token en lecture seule est attendu")
}
}
return w
}
if !has("/sdn", "SDN.Allocate") && !has("/sdn/zones", "SDN.Allocate") {
w = append(w, "SDN.Allocate absent sur /sdn : la synchro SDN échouera")
}
if dcOptions && !has("/", "Sys.Modify") {
w = append(w, "Sys.Modify absent sur / : les options datacenter ne pourront pas être écrites")
}
if !has("/", "Sys.Audit") {
w = append(w, "Sys.Audit absent sur / : options datacenter et versions illisibles")
}
return w
}
// nodes converts the versions read by the PVE client.
func nodes(vs []pve.NodeVersion) []Node {
out := make([]Node, 0, len(vs))
for _, v := range vs {
out = append(out, Node{Name: v.Node, Version: v.Version})
}
return out
}